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ABSTRACT 
Objective To assess the utility of data already existing within hospitals for 
monitoring patient safety 
Setting An acute hospital in Southern England 
Design Mapping of data sources proposed by staff as potentially able to identify 
patient safety issues followed by an in depth analysis of the content of seven key 
sources  
Data Source Analysis For each data source: scope and depth of content in 
relation to patient safety, number and type of patient safety incidents identified, 
degree of overlap with incidents identified by different sources, levels of patient 
harm associated with incidents. 
Results A wide range of data sources existing within the hospital setting have 
the potential to provide information about patient safety incidents. Poor quality of 
coding, delays in reports reaching databases, the narrow focus of some data 
sources, limited data collection periods and lack of central collation of findings 
were some of the barriers to making the best use of routine data sources for 
monitoring patient safety.  In depth analysis of seven key data sources (Clinical 
Incident database, Health and Safety Incident database, Complaints database, 
Claims database and Inquest database, the Patient Administration System and 
case notes) indicated that case notes have the potential to identify the largest 
number of incidents and provide the richest source of information on such 
incidents. The seven data sources identified different types of incidents with 
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differing levels of patient harm. There was little overlap between the incidents 
identified by different sources.  
Conclusion Despite issues related to the quality of coding, depth of information 
available and accessibility, triangulating information from more than one source 
can identify a broader range of incidents and provide additional information 
related to professional groups involved, types of patients affected and important 
contributory factors. Such an approach can provide a focus for further work and 
ultimately contributes to the identification of appropriate interventions that 
improve patient safety. 
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INTRODUCTION 
An integrated approach to risk management requires healthcare organizations to 
gather information on risk and safety from a range of information sources so that 
the scale and nature of key risk areas can be assessed. At a national level, the 
National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) has established a Patient Safety 
Observatory to quantify, characterise and prioritise patient safety issues by 
bringing together information held by different organisations.[1] At a local level, 
despite the fact that hospitals in the UK collect a wealth of data on many aspects 
of patient care, these data have been seen as an underutilised source of 
information on patient safety.[2] The majority of hospitals in England and Wales 
rely on voluntary reports of patient safety incidents (defined by the NPSA as 
unintended or unexpected incidents that could have or did lead to harm for one or 
more patients[3]) to Local Risk Management Systems (LRMS) to identify trends 
and areas for further investigation. The NPSA’s national database (the National 
Reporting and Learning System) consists almost entirely of data derived from this 
system. However this approach has been criticised as potentially misleading. A 
few studies have compared the number and types of incidents identified by 
LRMS with those identified by other sources including case notes,[4] internal 
departmental incident reporting systems[5] and computerised hospital 
administrative records.[6, 7] These have shown that LRMS can fail to pick up 
serious incidents and are more likely to identify incidents not attributable to direct 
staff action such as falls than those related to clinical care. Evidence also 
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suggests that nurses report more incidents than other staff groups, with 
significant under reporting by doctors.[8]  
 
A variety of methods have been used to identify adverse events affecting 
hospitalised patients including retrospective case note review, [9-11] in person 
collection of information from staff and case records on the wards,[12] direct 
observation,[13] screening of administrative data[14] and staff and patient 
surveys.[15] Comparisons of incidents detected by different methods has shown 
relatively little overlap between sources.[4, 7, 16]  These findings suggest that 
there may be a value in bringing together information on patient safety from a 
wider range of sources. Whilst most hospitals do not have the resources to 
institute some of the methodologies used in these studies, it is plausible that they 
are able to make better use of the data sources that they currently have. This 
study investigated the range of sources of information relevant to patient safety 
found within a single acute hospital in England, the scope of information held by 
these sources and how it might be used to examine key areas of patient safety. 
 
METHODS 
Design 
A mapping exercise, including semi structured interviews with 33 clinical and 
non-clinical staff, direct examination of data sources, and attendance at clinical 
governance meetings, was used to identify potentially useful hospital data 
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sources in a large district general hospital in Southern England with 850 beds 
and approximately 40,000 admissions per year. 
 
By judging each source against the criteria of number and types of incidents that 
could be identified, mode of data collection, accessibility and content, seven 
sources were selected for more detailed analysis. Retrospective data collection 
was undertaken in respect of adult medical and surgical inpatients admitted 
between 1st April 2004 and 31st March 2005. Data sources were assessed to 
identify the completeness of information found in each source, the number and 
types of incident detected, patient harm resulting from each incident and the 
degree of overlap between incidents identified by different sources. An incident 
was registered if the coded event suggested the potential to cause patient harm, 
even if harm was not explicitly recorded, as information on harm was not always 
available from some sources. All incidents detected were coded by category and 
by level of harm using the standard coding system employed by the National 
Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) (Table 1).[17] Completeness of 
information was assessed by identifying how many of the data items required by 
the NRLS incident report form were present.[18] Using patient full name as an 
identifier, the degree of overlap between records held on each database was 
examined.  
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Table 1 National Reporting and Learning System’s harm grading for patient 
safety incidents 
No Harm 
 
 
 
 
Impact prevented- any patient safety incident that had the potential to cause harm 
but was prevented, resulting in no harm to people receiving NHS- funded care 
Impact not prevented- any patient safety incident that ran to completion but no 
harm occurred to people receiving NHS-funded care 
 
Low  
 
Any patient safety incident that required extra observation or minor treatment  
 
Moderate  
 
Any patient safety incident that resulted in a moderate increase in treatment  
 
Severe  
 
Any patient safety incident that appears  to have resulted in permanent harm  
 
Death 
 
Any patient safety incident that directly resulted in death  
 
 
Data Sources 
The sources interrogated included: 
Five databases which made up the Trust’s Local Risk Management System. The 
Clinical Incident database, Health and Safety Incident database, Complaints 
database, Claims database and Inquest database were searched for patient-
identifiable entries linked to adult medical and surgical inpatients within the index 
year.  
The Patient Administration System (PAS). PAS was searched using the 41 three-
digit ICD 10 diagnosis codes for complications and misadventures.[19] Within 
each record, complication or misadventure codes appearing in the first of the six 
diagnostic code boxes, which is normally used to designate the reason for 
admission, were considered to indicate a pre-admission event and excluded.  
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Case notes. Two hundred and twenty randomly drawn records with an adult 
surgical or medical admission within the index year were reviewed. Reviews were 
undertaken using a method adapted from that described by Neale and 
Woloshynowych.[20] A 10% sample of case notes with no incident identified and 
a 25% sample of positive case notes were further reviewed by a second expert 
reviewer (SO). All positive cases were also discussed with two expert reviewers 
(SO and GN).  The presence of a patient safety incident was ascribed only if all 
three reviewers were in agreement (75% of cases).  
 
RESULTS 
Data quality issues 
Box 1 describes the range of data sources that have the potential to provide 
information about patient safety incidents occurring in medical and surgical 
inpatients that exist within the hospital. These sources could be divided into four 
main types: Incident Reporting Systems, Surveillance Systems, Audits and 
others (including case notes, the Patient Administration System, minutes from 
Morbidity and Mortality meetings, written claims and inquest records). Poor 
quality of coding, delays in reports reaching databases, the narrow focus of some 
data sources, time-limited data collection periods and lack of central collation of 
findings were some of the barriers that limited the scope for routine data sources 
to be used in monitoring patient safety. 
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Box 1 Description of data sources collecting information on patient safety in one hospital and issues related to 
using such sources to monitor patient safety 
Data source Incident Reporting systems Surveillance 
Systems 
Audit Data Patient Administration 
System 
Case notes and 
other written 
records 
Description Includes the Local Risk 
Management System, 
containing coded information on 
clinical and health and safety 
incidents, complaints, claims 
and inquests. Pathology, 
diagnostic services (radiology, 
endoscopy etc) and electro 
biomedical departments had 
internal incident reporting 
systems 
A number of 
mandatory and 
voluntary surveillance 
systems existed. 
These tended to be 
focused on key public 
health concerns such 
as infection control 
e.g. MRSA 
bacteraemia 
surveillance, or  
specific high risk 
areas e.g. transfusion 
of blood products or 
the introduction of 
new drugs  
A number of local 
hospital audits e.g. 
Resuscitation Audit 
and national audits 
e.g. National 
Confidential Enquiry 
into Peri operative 
Outcomes and Deaths 
collected information 
on outcomes of clinical 
care such as 
complications or errors 
in the process of care, 
residual disability or 
death  
Clinical information was 
available as a by product 
of  the hospital’s 
administration and 
reimbursement system. 41 
ICD 10 codes were being 
used to code for 
complications and 
misadventures  
 
Included patient case 
notes, minutes of 
Morbidity and 
Mortality meetings, 
written records 
related to claims and 
inquests 
Categories of 
incident 
commonly 
found in 
these 
sources 
Patient accidents, medication 
errors, equipment failures, 
access to care, admissions and 
discharges, communication 
failures, complications or delays 
related to diagnostic testing 
Infection control, 
blood transfusion, 
medication incident 
Clinical assessment, 
implementation of care 
and monitoring, 
infection control, 
medication errors and 
treatments and 
procedures 
Infection control, 
treatment and procedures 
Access to care, 
admissions and 
discharges, clinical 
assessment, 
implementation of 
care and monitoring, 
infection control, 
communication, 
infrastructure, 
medication errors 
and treatments and 
procedures 
Mode of data 
collection 
Continuous Majority continuous Majority have limited 
period of data 
collection 
Continuous Continuous or 
recurring 
Accessibility Majority electronic Majority electronic Mixture of electronic Electronic Paper 
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and paper 
How 
complete are 
individual 
reports 
Graded 1-4* 
Mainly 3  
Information about incidents in 
complaints and claims records 
is usually from the 
patient/carer’s perspective only 
as is any reference to harm 
2-4  
Varies between 
sources from limited 
information required 
by MRSA 
bacteraemia 
surveillance to 
detailed reports 
required by Serious 
Hazards of 
Transfusion 
Reporting System 
2-3  
Sometimes clinical 
judgment is required to 
identify both incident 
and degree of harm 
which may not be 
referred to explicitly in 
the record. 
Complication of care 
may be recorded but 
information on patient 
harm missing 
2  
Very little information on 
the incident. Information 
related to patient harm 
limited to whether  the 
patient was discharged 
alive or died  
3-4 
Case notes provide 
the most 
comprehensive 
information on 
incidents. Inquest 
and Claims records 
can contain post 
mortem reports and 
detailed hospital 
reports 
Issues 
related to 
using data 
source 
Under reporting especially by 
health professionals other than 
nurses 
Poor quality of coding of 
incidents by type/ subtype 
Lack of risk factor information 
e.g. age, gender, ethnicity 
Profession of reporter or person 
involved in the incident not 
always collected 
Bias towards low harm no harm 
events 
Delays in complaints and 
claims reaching hospital 
Subjectivity of content of 
complaints and claims records  
Information from departmental 
incident reporting systems not 
shared outside those 
departments 
Narrow focus 
Information often not 
collated and analyzed 
locally 
 
Lack of central 
collation of findings 
Poor quality of some 
local audits 
Short term data 
collection and limited 
sample sizes 
National audits such as 
the confidential 
enquiries may only 
sample a small number 
of patients from each 
hospital 
 
Misses complications of 
treatment not specifically 
coded using one of the 41 
ICD 10 codes 
Completeness and 
accuracy of use of these 
codes by medical coders 
 Judgment may be 
required to separate 
complications that were 
the main reason for an 
admission from those that 
occurred during an 
admission 
Bias introduced by the 
limited number of  codes 
which will tend to identify 
more surgical than 
medical patients 
Time taken to gather 
information from 
written records 
Missing records or 
parts of records 
Poor legibility 
Sensitivity of material 
and willingness of 
staff to share 
information with a 
wider audience 
* Completeness rating: 1= no patient identifiable information, 2= patient identifiable information, subjective/ implicit information or scanty details on 
incident, link to harm not clear, 3=patient identifiable information, more detailed information about incident (place, time, person), some links with 
harm, no prevention or further action, 4= patient identifiable information, more detailed information about incident (place, time, person), harm 
described/ graded for harm, action or prevention described.
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Of the seven data sources selected for more detailed analysis, case notes 
contained the most detailed information on individual incidents including risk 
factors such as age, ethnicity or comorbidities, time, place and location, 
description of the incident, levels of harm and contributory factors. The Clinical 
Incident database also contained many of these data items but information on 
risk factors and contributory factors was usually not entered. In addition, the 
category of healthcare professional who was either involved in the incident or 
who made the report was often missing.  It was difficult to make objective 
assessments of patient harm for incidents detected in the Complaints database 
or on the PAS system. For the former, information on harm was principally from 
the patient or carer’s perspective only and for the latter there was inadequate 
detail. Elucidating the temporal sequence of events was sometimes challenging 
with individual PAS records, occasionally leading to difficulty distinguishing 
preadmission diagnoses or comorbidities from in-hospital incidents. 
 
Numbers of incidents and degree of overlap between sources 
Table 2 shows the number patient safety incidents identified by each of the seven 
data sources in total and the number identified exclusively by each source. Case 
notes potentially identify the largest number incidents. Seventy one patient safety 
incidents were found across 220 inpatient admissions (32.3%). Of these, 40 
(18.1%) fulfilled the definition of an adverse event (an unintended injury or 
complication of care leading to prolonged admission, disability at discharge or 
death and caused by healthcare management rather than the disease process), 
the term most often used to describe incidents in previous studies.  Sixty five 
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patient safety incidents were single events. Three patients experienced 2 
incidents during the index admission. Based on these findings, it can be 
estimated that 8,781(95% CI 6,495-12,144) incidents could potentially be 
identified across the 27,270 adult medical and surgical admissions between 
1.4.04 and 31.3.03.  The second largest source of patient safety incidents was 
the Clinical Incident database with 484 incidents identified within the index year. 
This was followed by PAS (462 incidents), Complaints (221 incidents) and Health 
and Safety (176 incidents).  Inquest and Claims records identified small numbers 
of events, 21 and 10 respectively.  
 
 
Table 2   Number of incidents identified by each of the seven data sources 
for adult medical and surgical patient admissions between 1.4.04 and 
31.3.05. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*estimate based on a sample of 220 inpatient admissions 
**Of the 71 patient safety incidents identified from case notes, 10 were also found by other sources 
 
 
Table 3 demonstrates that the degree of overlap between incidents picked up by 
different data sources was small. 
 
 
 
 
Data Source 
 
 
Total no. of 
incidents 
identified 
No. of 
incidents 
exclusively 
identified 
by source 
Case Notes* 8781 NA** 
Clinical Incidents 484 428 
PAS  462 399 
Health and Safety 221 197 
Complaints 176 148 
Inquest 21 10 
Claims 10 7 
Total 10190  
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Table 3 Degree of overlap between incidents identified by each data source, 
April 2004 to March 2005 
Clinical 
Incidents 
(484) 
Clinical 
Incidents 
     
Claims 
(10) 
3 Claims     
Inquests 
(21) 
9 0 Inquests    
Complaints 
(176) 
4 2 2 Complaints   
Health & 
Safety 
(221) 
7 0 1 10 Heath & 
Safety 
 
PAS 
(462) 
 
35 1 3 12 14 PAS 
Case 
notes 
(71) 
3 0 0 2 1 6 
 
 
Types of incidents identified by different data sources 
Different data sources tended to identify different proportions of incidents in each 
category. (Table 4) 37.5% of incidents identified via the Clinical Incident database 
were medication errors and equipment failures.  Complaints provide an insight 
into incidents related to communication failures (22% of total). The PAS system, 
Inquests database and case notes identified many incidents linked to surgical 
interventions and to investigative procedures. The PAS system was also useful in 
identifying incidents related to infection control. (See Box 2 for examples of 
incidents detected by different data sources) 
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Table 4  Numbers and proportions of incidents in each category detected 
by different data sources, April 2004 to March 2005  
NPSA Incident 
Categories 
 Clinical 
Incidents 
Complaints  Health 
& 
Safety 
 Claims  Inquests PAS  Case  
notes 
Access, 
admission, 
transfer 
67 
(13.8%) 
15 
(8.5%)     
8 
(11.3%) 
Clinical 
assessment 
39  
(8.1%) 
12  
(6.8%)  
2  
(20%) 
5  
(23.8%)  
13  
(18.3%) 
Consent, 
communication& 
confidentiality 
33  
(6.8%) 
39 
(22.2%)      
Disruptive, 
aggressive 
behaviour 
2  
(0.4%) 
1  
(0.6%) 
2 
(0.9%)     
Documentation 43  
(8.9%) 
3  
(1.7%)      
Care & ongoing 
monitoring and 
review 
31  
(6.4%) 
29  
(16.5%)  
1  
(10%) 
1  
(4.8%)  
7 
(9.9%) 
Infection Control 2  
(0.4%) 
16  
(9.1%)  
2  
(20%) 
1  
(4.8%) 
181 
(39.2%) 
9 
(12.7%) 
Infrastructure 
 
34  
(7.0%) 
29  
(16.5%)   
1  
(4.8%)  
2  
(2.8%) 
Medical 
equipment 
73 
(15.1%)  
7 
(3.2%) 
1  
(10%)  
4  
(0.9%) 
1  
(1.4%) 
Medication error 100 
(20.7%) 
4  
(2.3%)   
1  
(4.8%) 
13 
(2.8%) 
15 
(21.1%) 
Patient abuse  
  
3  
(1.7%)      
Patient accident 15  
(3.1%) 
7  
(4.0%) 
212 
(95.9%)  
1  
(4.8%)   
Self harming 
behaviour 
1  
(0.2%)       
Treatment, 
procedure 
44  
(9.1%) 
18  
(10.2%)  
4  
(40%) 
11 
(52.4%) 
264 
(57.1%) 
16 
(22.5%) 
 
Total 
 
484 
 
176 
 
221 
 
10 21 462 40 
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 Box 2 Examples of different categories of incident detected by different 
data sources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clinical Incidents: Medication error 
Patient given 5 doses of Co-dydramol in one day, although prescribed four times daily - 
no patient complaints. Drug chart needed re-writing, previous entries illegible. 
Complaints: Consent, communication, confidentiality 
Patient's daughter raises concerns regarding doctor's attitude.  When she spoke to 
doctor, she was told mother was doing very well when in fact the doctor was describing 
a different patient.   
Health and Safety Incidents: Patient accident 
Patient being weighed on sitting scales, mobility poor and brakes loose, scales moved 
and patient fell on her side to the floor. Slight graze to existing haematoma on right 
elbow and possible injury to right hip. 
Claims: Treatment, procedure 
Patient had right ankle injected instead of left. 
Inquest: Clinical assessment 
Patient attended A&E 3 times and set home with diagnosis of tonsillitis. Prescribed 
antibiotics.  Finally presented with severe shock requiring resuscitation and surgery. 
Delay in diagnosing haemorrhage due to ruptured spleen. Patient died. 
Patient Administration System: Infection control 
Diagnosis 
 1 
Diagnosis 
2 
Diagnosis 
3 
Diagnosis  
4 
Diagnosis  
5 
Diagnosis 
6 
Procedure  
1 
 I803 ~ Phlebitis 
and 
thrombophlebitis 
of lower 
extremities 
unspecified 
 I739 ~ 
Peripheral 
vascular 
disease 
unspecified 
 I10X ~ 
Essential 
(primary) 
hypertensi
on 
 T814 ~ 
Infection 
following a 
procedure 
not 
elsewhere 
classified 
 B956 ~ 
Staph 
aureus as 
cause of 
dis 
classified 
to other 
chapters 
 N390 ~ 
Urinary 
tract 
infection 
site not 
specified 
 L592 ~ Bypass of 
femoral artery by 
anastomosis of 
femoral artery to 
popliteal artery using 
prosthesis 
 
Adverse Event from case note review: Treatment, procedure 
Cystic artery inadvertently cut during laparoscopic cholecystectomy. Operation 
converted to a laparoscopy in order to control bleeding. Blood loss estimated as two 
litres. Post operative blood transfusion given. 
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Levels of Patient Harm 
Incidents were graded by severity; the proportion of incidents graded as causing 
death, severe, moderate, low or no harm varied among the different data sources 
(Table 5). Incidents found in inquest and claims records tended to be associated 
with death or serious harm; case records identified incidents mainly causing 
moderate or low levels of harm and LRMS databases captured a higher 
proportion of incidents causing low levels of harm or no harm. Although there 
was not enough information available to code the majority of incidents detected 
by the PAS, 8.4% of patients with a coded complication or misadventure in their 
record died. (see Box 3 for examples of incidents graded for differing levels of 
patient harm). 
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Table 5 Proportion of incidents in different harm grades for each data 
source, April 2004 to March 2005  
 
 
  
 
 
 
Clinical 
Incidents 
 
 
Complaints 
 
 
 
 
Health 
and 
Safety 
 
 Claims 
 
 
 
 Inquest 
 
 
 
Case 
notes 
 
 
 
Death 
 
8  
(1.7%) 
0 
 
0 
 
2  
(20%) 
21  
(100%) 
2  
(2.8) 
 
Severe 
 
9  
(1.9%) 
1  
(0.6%) 
2  
(0.9%) 
0 
 
0 
 
2  
(2.8) 
 
Moderate 
 
28  
(5.8%) 
18  
(10.2%) 
3  
(1.4%) 
2  
(20%) 
0 
 
18 
(25.4%) 
 
Low 
 
114 
(23.6%) 
38  
(21.6%) 
86 
 (38.9%) 
6  
(60%) 
0 
 
35 
(49.2%) 
No harm 
impact not 
prevented 
259 
(53.5%) 
107  
(60.8) 
127 
(57.4%) 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
No harm 
impact 
prevented 
66 
(13.6%) 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
Not possible 
to code 
 
0 
 
12  
(6.8%) 
3  
(1.4%) 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
Total 
 
484 
 
176 
 
221 
 
10 
 
21 
 
71 
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Box 3 Examples of incidents graded for differing levels of patient harm 
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Clinical Incident: No harm impact prevented 
Patient's “to take home” medication mislabelled as 5mg Amlodipine when 
contents in the bag were in fact 10mg. Nurse informed pharmacy of error and 
returned the drugs 
Health and Safety: No harm impact not prevented 
Patient found sitting on floor by staff.  No obvious injury noted. 
Complaints: Low 
Patient's son has written regarding her mother was who given a wrong wrist 
band in A&E on 2/4/04.  He also has other concerns regarding a cannula 
which was left in his mother when discharged. 
Claims: Moderate 
Patient is diabetic with circulatory problems. Allegation made that insufficient 
care was taken during his admission to prevent development of pressure 
sores which became infected with MRSA. 
Case Note Review, Adverse Event: Severe 
Patient who was post coronary artery bypass graft gradually deteriorated over 
one week with symptoms of shortness of breath and a discharging chest 
wound. Clinical team failed to investigate reason for deterioration. After 5 days 
became acutely unwell and found to have developed chest wound breakdown 
and a passageway between the wound and chest cavity. Transferred to ITU 
and put on a ventilator. Recovery took several weeks. 
Inquest: Death 
Patient died following a right hemicolectomy. Cause of death on post mortum 
was I) Haemorrhage due to right hemicolectomy, II) Crohns' disease 
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 DISCUSSION 
 The aim of this study was to explore the feasibility of using a range of hospital 
data sources to identify patient safety incidents in order to provide a better picture 
of the scale and scope of incidents related to key safety issues in an English 
hospital. The study focuses on routine data sources that are available within the 
hospital setting.  
 
A number of limitations should be considered. The study was carried out in a 
single acute hospital and, although data sources identified by the mapping 
exercise as containing potentially useful patient safety information are likely to be 
present in other sites, accessibility, quality of coding and completeness may vary 
from site to site. The study also focused on data sources linked to medical and 
surgical inpatients only. Whilst these sources also provide information on 
incidents related to other specialties and outpatients, there will be additional data 
sources that can also be utilised for this purpose and some tailoring in relation to 
the issue being explored is necessary. 
 
Many routine hospital data sources collect data for purposes other than 
identifying patient safety incidents. These data are observational rather than 
experimental and are prone to biases introduced by differential reporting levels, 
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the variable quality of coding and levels of completeness. The most useful 
supplementary information sources would be those that collect timely data on a 
continuous basis, which are accessible and have appropriate content. Timely and 
continuous data collection is important for analysis of trends over time. These 
conditions limit the use of many hospital sources where data collection is short-
lived and non-recurring. Accessibility is also limited by the long delays in 
information reaching some sources, the lack of central collation, poorly coded 
electronic information and the amount of time required to review written records. 
Staff may also feel uncomfortable sharing some types of sensitive information, an 
attitude difficult to change if the hospital’s culture is not perceived as open and 
fair.  Important content, such as information related to risk factors including age, 
gender, ethnicity or profession of health care worker involved are often not 
available. Furthermore, the patchy nature of data collection across any health 
care organisation and the narrow focus of much of this data collection will 
inevitably mean that there will be gaps in information in certain areas.  
 
Limited information makes it difficult to identify incidents. In the Complaints and 
Claims databases the descriptions of events are mainly from the patient or 
carer’s perspective with limited information from the hospital, diagnoses in PAS 
records to not indicate when they occurred, and information on patient harm, 
apart from death, not available. To get the most out of the data available a 
pragmatic approach was taken to identifying incidents, judging whether the event 
described had the potential to cause patient harm, even if that harm was not 
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explicitly recorded. This may have led to some overestimation of the numbers of 
incidents. The relatively small sample of case notes reviewed, representing 0.8% 
of all adult medical and surgical admissions in the index year, also increases the 
degree of uncertainty around estimates of the total number of patient safety 
incidents that can be identified by this method. These problems of validity and 
reliability highlight why such sources should not be used for comparisons of 
facilities. However, they are less important when hospitals are using the data 
internally to pinpoint areas of concern as part of internal quality improvement 
processes.  
 
Our analyses, which focused on seven data sources, indicated that the Clinical 
Incident database, the main database used by many trusts to monitor patient 
safety incidents, identifies relatively few incidents overall. This finding is in line 
with previous studies.[4, 7, 21] In addition, each source picked up its own unique 
collection of incidents both in terms of type and levels of harm, with minimal 
overlap between sources. From the mapping exercise it is clear that there are 
many other data sources found within the hospital setting which have the 
potential to provide useful information on patient safety, particularly if use is 
tailored to the investigation of specific problems. Triangulating information from a 
wider range of data sources presents an opportunity to gain a greater 
understanding of key patient safety issues, including a better understanding of 
the common types of incidents, the healthcare professional groups and types of 
patients involved, and important contributory factors. It offers the opportunity to 
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learn from events that cover the spectrum of patient harm. Using information from 
a range of sources can enhance investigations of key risk areas such as 
medication errors, diagnostic testing, infection control or treatments and 
procedures. (see Figure 1 for an example)  It offers both a mechanism for 
ongoing monitoring and an opportunity to better focus clinical governance 
activities such as audit or targeted case note review.  The future development of 
validated patient safety indicators, similar to those employed by the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) in the US will increase the utility of 
information derived from administrative data such as PAS.[22]   Collaborative 
working between clinical staff, clinical risk teams and information technology is 
essential to make the most of all the data sources available. Staff cooperation, in 
turn, depends on the presence of an open and fair culture, with an emphasis on 
learning from incidents rather than apportioning blame.  
 
Information plays a vital role in identifying, monitoring and investigating levels of 
risk, promoting safer healthcare within organizations and enabling delivery of the 
continuous quality improvement that underpins the clinical governance agenda in 
the UK. Chief executives and directors of Trusts are now accountable for 
organization-wide assessment of patient safety risks. This study highlights the 
advantages of triangulating information from a range of sources when making 
such assessments. Leadership from senior managers is vital to promote a culture 
that promotes the sharing of information derived from these sources among 
different departments. The directors are also in a position, based on the findings 
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from local investigations or intelligence received from external sources, to identify 
key risk areas requiring further investigation anywhere in the hospital and to 
provide the resources needed to ensure that the methodology and findings from 
such investigations are disseminated and further in depth work such as audit is 
commissioned if necessary. Such a targeted approach to improving patient safety 
would allow for the most efficient use of scarce resources. Clinical governance 
teams could provide technical support to departmental staff, helping them to  
identify and exploit information sources that are relevant for a particular 
investigation, along with advice on search strategies, collation and analysis of 
these data. Work to overcome the limitations of some data sources, such as 
improvement of the quality and consistency of electronically coded information or 
institution of new data collection systems to address key knowledge gaps could 
be part of this support. Such an approach need not be restricted to acute 
hospitals although the challenges relating to sharing information across the 
primary-secondary care interface are likely to be more significant. 
 
The NPSA’s National Reporting and Learning System draws the majority of the 
incident reports it uses for monitoring national trends from LRMS. The agency 
acknowledges that incident reporting systems alone can never be relied upon to 
provide a comprehensive picture of patient safety.[1] At a national level, the 
NPSA draws more widely on intelligence from a range of sources both within and 
external to the NHS via its Patient Safety Observatory to better characterize 
patient safety issues. At the local level ,data from a broader range of local 
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sources would also seem to offer valuable supplementary information to the 
NPSA. Such findings could reach the agency via its network of Patient Safety 
Managers who currently work closely with individual Trusts. 
 
In Conclusion, gaining intelligence on patient safety incidents from a broader 
range of  information sources has the potential to provide healthcare 
organizations with a better picture of key patient safety risks facilitating targeting 
of scare resources on appropriate interventions with the potential to improve 
patient safety. 
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